Threat Model: Secrets & Supply Chain
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| Created |
2026-08-09 |
| Last reviewed |
2026-10-13 |
| Next review due |
2027-04-13 (6-month cadence, or on any change to secret sync, CI identity, image build, or release flow) |
| Reviewers |
Platform owner |
| Version |
2.2 |
| Surface owner |
Platform / DevOps |
Scope: how secret values reach workloads, how CI gets cloud credentials, and how code and images reach prod. Covers GCP Secret Manager + External Secrets, GitHub Actions WIF into terraform-ci, terraform-apply and tomoda-release, the three first-party GitHub Apps, GHCR images, Argo CD delivery, OTA publish, and native builds.
For how these work, see Secrets Management, IAM, GCP, GitHub, Terraform CI/CD and ARC runners.
Platform constraint that shapes every row: the repos are private on GitHub Free, so branch protection, rulesets and environment protection rules are unavailable. Any principal with write access can push main, and every Actions secret is readable by a workflow on any branch.
Data flow diagrams
Path 1: secret sync (Secret Manager to pod)
flowchart LR
E1([E1 · Operator]) -->|F1 gcloud secrets versions add| D1
subgraph gcp[trust boundary: GCP project development-485000]
D1[(D1 · Secret Manager<br/>63 containers, values by hand)]
end
subgraph cluster[trust boundary: k3s cluster]
D2[(D2 · gcpsm-credentials<br/>eso-reader SA key)]
P1[P1 · ESO<br/>ClusterSecretStore gsm-tomoda]
D2 -->|F2 static key| P1
P1 -->|F3 secretAccessor, project-wide| D1
P1 -->|F4 materialize, 1h refresh| D3[(D3 · K8s Secrets)]
D3 -->|F5 env / volume| P2[P2 · workloads]
end
flowchart LR
E2([E2 · repo writer<br/>human or App]) -->|F6 push branch / open PR / push main| D4[(D4 · tomoda-labs/devops)]
subgraph gha[trust boundary: CI runner, plan on ARC tomoda-arc, apply GitHub-hosted]
P3[P3 · terraform-plan / apply<br/>runs the ref's own workflow file]
end
D4 -->|F7 trigger| P3
subgraph gcp[trust boundary: GCP]
P4[P4 · WIF pool github-actions<br/>repository condition]
P5[P5 · terraform-ci SA<br/>read-only, plan inputs]
P11[P11 · terraform-apply SA<br/>projectIamAdmin, secretmanager.admin, ...]
D1[(D1 · Secret Manager)]
D5[(D5 · tfstate bucket)]
end
P3 -->|F8 OIDC token| P4
P4 -->|F9 plan, any ref| P5
P4 -->|F22 apply, terraform-apply.yml on main only| P11
P5 -->|F10 read plan-input secrets| D1
P11 -->|F11 state r/w| D5
P11 -->|F12 apply| E3([E3 · GCP, Cloudflare, GitHub, Tailscale APIs])
Path 3: build, release and delivery
flowchart LR
E2([E2 · repo writer]) -->|F13 push / dispatch| P6
subgraph gha[trust boundary: GitHub Actions]
P6[P6 · images.yml / release.yml / ota.yml]
D6[(D6 · repo Actions secret<br/>XAVIA_DEV_UPLOAD_KEY)]
D6 --> P6
end
subgraph gcp[trust boundary: GCP]
P12[P12 · WIF pool github-actions-tomoda<br/>tomoda main only]
P13[P13 · tomoda-release SA]
D8[(D8 · release App key<br/>prod OTA upload key)]
end
P6 -->|F23 OIDC token, release.yml / ota.yml on main| P12
P12 --> P13
P13 -->|F24 secretAccessor on two secrets| D8
D8 --> P6
P6 -->|F14 push tag, GITHUB_TOKEN packages:write| D7[(D7 · GHCR)]
P6 -->|F15 tomoda-release App: deploy PR| D4[(D4 · devops main)]
P6 -->|F16 upload key| P9
subgraph cluster[trust boundary: k3s cluster]
P7[P7 · Argo CD<br/>auto-sync, selfHeal]
P8[P8 · image-updater<br/>dev-* tags, dev only]
P9[P9 · Xavia OTA server]
P10[P10 · ARC runners tomoda-arc, tomoda-arc-db, tomoda-arc-trusted]
end
D4 -->|F17 desired state| P7
D7 -->|F18 pull by tag, Always| P7
P8 -->|F19 newest dev-* tag| P7
P9 -->|F20 JS bundle| E4([E4 · app installs])
E5([E5 · developer Mac]) -->|F21 native build, signing secrets| E6([E6 · App Store / Play])
DFD elements
| Ref |
Type |
Element |
Notes |
| E1 |
External |
Operator |
Sets secret values by hand |
| E2 |
External |
Repo writer |
Humans and Apps with write; see Assets |
| E5 |
External |
Developer Mac |
Only native build path; no native CI |
| P1 |
Process |
External Secrets Operator |
k8s/envs/platform/manifests/external-secrets-config.yaml |
| P3 |
Process |
Terraform workflows |
.github/workflows/terraform-{plan,apply}.yml |
| P4 |
Process |
WIF provider |
infrastructure/gcp/wif.tf |
| P5 |
Process |
terraform-ci |
infrastructure/gcp/service_accounts.tf; read roles only, used by plans |
| P11 |
Process |
terraform-apply |
infrastructure/gcp/service_accounts.tf; bound to terraform-apply.yml on main (wif.tf) |
| P6 |
Process |
Build/release workflows |
tomoda .github/workflows/{images,release,ota}.yml, devops .github/workflows/images.yml |
| P7 |
Process |
Argo CD |
Applications in project default, automated sync with selfHeal |
| P8 |
Process |
argocd-image-updater |
k8s/envs/platform/manifests/image-updater.yaml |
| P10 |
Process |
ARC runner scale sets (tomoda-arc, tomoda-arc-db, tomoda-arc-trusted) |
k8s/envs/platform/arc-runners*/values.yaml |
| P12 |
Process |
tomoda WIF provider |
infrastructure/gcp/wif.tf; repository == tomoda-labs/tomoda and ref == refs/heads/main |
| P13 |
Process |
tomoda-release |
infrastructure/gcp/service_accounts.tf; bound to tomoda release.yml, ota.yml and devops notify-prod-deploy.yml on main |
| D1 |
Store |
Secret Manager |
infrastructure/gcp/secrets.tf, prevent_destroy |
| D2 |
Store |
external-secrets/gcpsm-credentials |
Created by scripts/ovh/bootstrap-argocd.sh |
| D5 |
Store |
tomoda-tfstate |
Versioned, infrastructure/gcp/storage.tf |
| D8 |
Store |
tomoda-release-app-private-key, tomoda-ota-prod-upload-key |
In D1; readable by tomoda-release, eso-reader and project owners |
| D7 |
Store |
GHCR |
tomoda-backend, tomoda-frontend, tomoda-postgres, tomoda-arc-runner, xavia-ota |
Assets and trust boundaries
| Asset |
Where |
Why it matters |
terraform-apply |
WIF, terraform-apply.yml on main only |
projectIamAdmin + secretmanager.admin + serviceAccountAdmin + workloadIdentityPoolAdmin: owner-equivalent on the project |
terraform-ci |
WIF, any devops ref |
Read-only in GCP; reads the plan inputs, which include write-capable provider tokens |
| eso-reader key |
D2 |
Reads every secret in D1 |
| tomoda-release App key |
D8, read through WIF by release workflows on main |
contents:write on devops; can push main |
| tomoda-terraform App key |
D1 |
administration:write, members:write on all repos |
| tomoda-ci-automation App key |
D1, synced to arc-runners, trivy-issue-reporter, Argo repo secret |
administration:write, organization_self_hosted_runners:write |
| OTA prod upload key |
D8, read through WIF by ota.yml on main |
Ships JS to every prod install |
| Native signing material |
D1 (tomoda-ios-match-passphrase, tomoda-android-*, tomoda-asc-api-key, tomoda-play-service-account), GCS tomoda-ios-certs |
Signs and publishes store binaries |
Who has write. Teams Core, Infra and App-dev and the outside collaborators hold write on their repos; repo admin comes only from the org owner role. Membership and grants are in infrastructure/github/access.tf; check the live repo collaborator list when auditing.
Installed Apps that can write code: tomoda-release (selected repos, contents:write), claude (all repos, contents + workflows write), google-labs-jules (selected, contents + workflows write), cloudflare-workers-and-pages (selected, contents + administration write). Org 2FA is not required. allowed_actions = "all", default_workflow_permissions = "read" (infrastructure/github/repos.tf).
STRIDE
Spoofing
| Ref |
Threat |
Mitigation |
Residual |
| F8, F9, F22 |
A devops workflow run gets owner-equivalent GCP access |
Provider condition pins assertion.repository == 'tomoda-labs/devops'; forks and other repos rejected. terraform-apply is bound through job_workflow_ref to terraform-apply.yml on refs/heads/main (infrastructure/gcp/wif.tf); PR runs, other branches, workflow_dispatch on a branch and other workflow files get only read-only terraform-ci |
Low. A push to main applies; see the accepted branch-protection finding |
| F2 |
Stolen eso-reader key used off-cluster |
Key exists only in D2; no key in git |
Medium. Static key, expiry 9999-12-31; usable from anywhere |
| F15, F23 |
A tomoda branch or PR run reads the tomoda-release key |
Key lives only in Secret Manager. The tomoda provider accepts only ref == refs/heads/main, and tomoda-release is bound through job_workflow_ref to release.yml and ota.yml on main (infrastructure/gcp/wif.tf); devops binds only notify-prod-deploy.yml on main. App tokens are minted per job and scoped by repositories |
Medium. A writer who pushes tomoda main runs as tomoda-release; see the accepted branch-protection finding |
Tampering
| Ref |
Threat |
Mitigation |
Residual |
| F6, F17 |
Direct push to devops main deploys to prod and runs terraform apply |
Review by convention; repo write limited to the team; admin only from the org role; Argo selfHeal reverts drift to main only |
High, accepted. Free plan: no branch protection, no environment gate (terraform-apply.yml comment) |
| F14, F18 |
Re-pushed GHCR tag replaces a prod image |
Workflows skip a tag that already exists (images.yml imagetools inspect); provenance attestation attached by docker/build-push-action |
Medium. Skip is in-workflow only, tags are mutable, prod pins tag not digest, imagePullPolicy: Always (k8s/apps/tomoda/base/*-deployment.yaml). Attestation is never verified |
| F19 |
Any dev-* tag auto-deploys to dev |
Dev only; prod moves only by deploy PR |
Low. A branch workflow can push dev-x to GHCR |
| F16, F20 |
Malicious OTA bundle to prod |
Prod upload key only through WIF on main (F23); ota.yml also checks refs/heads/main and that devops pins the tag |
Medium. A push to tomoda main can edit ota.yml; see Release Integrity |
| P6 |
Compromised third-party action |
Dependabot github-actions weekly in both repos; dataaxiom/ghcr-cleanup-action SHA-pinned |
Medium. Every other action is a mutable tag; aquasecurity/trivy-action@master (.github/workflows/infra-lint.yml) tracks a branch |
| P10 |
PR job poisons shared runner cache |
Runners are ephemeral pods, maxRunners: 3 |
Medium. hostPath /var/cache/tomoda-ci (mode 777) is shared across all jobs and repos on the node, including PR jobs (backend-ci.yml, frontend-ci.yml) |
| D1 |
Dependency CVE in source |
Dependabot: tomoda gomod, npm, github-actions; devops terraform, github-actions. Trivy operator scans running images (HIGH, CRITICAL) and files issues |
Medium. devops Dependabot terraform covers only /infrastructure/cloudflare. Trivy IaC scan is exit-code: '0'; no image scan before push |
Repudiation
| Ref |
Threat |
Mitigation |
Residual |
| F1 |
Who changed a secret value |
Secret Manager admin activity logs version adds |
Low |
| F6 |
Who pushed main |
Git history, GitHub audit log |
Low |
| E5 |
Which build a store binary came from |
Fastlane runs on one Mac |
Medium. No CI log or attestation for native builds |
| Ref |
Threat |
Mitigation |
Residual |
| F3 |
eso-reader reads secrets no cluster workload needs |
Single role secretmanager.secretAccessor |
Medium. Project-wide: covers CI-only and native signing secrets (tomoda-github-terraform-app-private-key, tomoda-release-app-private-key, tomoda-ios-match-passphrase, tomoda-android-upload-keystore, tomoda-play-service-account) |
| P1 |
Any namespace pulls any secret |
ExternalSecrets land via Argo from devops main only |
Medium. gsm-tomoda is a ClusterSecretStore with no conditions; reachable from every namespace |
| F10 |
PR code exfiltrates provider secrets |
::add-mask:: on values; terraform-ci reads only local.terraform_ci_plan_secrets (infrastructure/gcp/service_accounts.tf) |
High, accepted. Plan job reads the Cloudflare API token, asset signing keys, Tailscale OAuth secret, alert webhook and tomoda-terraform App key into PR-branch code; registered under Release Integrity |
| D6 |
Branch workflow reads tomoda Actions secrets |
Release App key and prod upload key are not repo secrets (D8); default_workflow_permissions = "read" |
Low. The one repo secret left, XAVIA_DEV_UPLOAD_KEY, reaches every branch and publishes to dev only |
| P8 |
image-updater reads every cluster Secret |
Runs in argocd |
Low. ClusterRole grants secrets get/list/watch cluster-wide; it needs one |
| P2 |
Grafana admin login |
Fronted by oauth2-proxy (auth.proxy); admin password from the grafana-admin-credentials ExternalSecret (k8s/envs/platform/monitoring/values.yaml) |
Low. Login form stays on |
| E5 |
Signing material on a laptop |
Per-secret secretAccessor and tomoda-ios-certs read for native releasers only (infrastructure/gcp/people.tf); tomoda-ios-certs has public access prevention |
Medium. Secrets land in the developer's shell |
Denial of service
| Ref |
Threat |
Mitigation |
Residual |
| D1 |
Secret container deleted |
prevent_destroy on every container |
Low |
| D7 |
Retention deletes a live tag |
ghcr-cleanup.yml deletes untagged only, validate: true; manual runs default to dry run |
Low |
| F2 |
eso-reader key revoked or rotated badly |
Synced K8s Secrets persist |
Low. Value changes stop syncing until D2 is replaced |
Elevation of privilege
| Ref |
Threat |
Mitigation |
Residual |
| P5, P11 |
devops writer becomes project owner |
Only terraform-apply holds projectIamAdmin and secretmanager.admin, and only terraform-apply.yml on main can assume it; terraform-ci is read-only |
Low. A push to main applies; see the accepted branch-protection finding |
| F15 |
tomoda writer becomes prod deployer |
Release App key only on tomoda main (F23); deploy PRs reviewed by convention |
Medium. A tomoda writer who pushes main can run as tomoda-release and push devops main, which also triggers apply as terraform-apply; see the accepted branch-protection finding |
| P10 |
Runner job reaches cluster |
Values grant the runner no service account or RBAC |
Medium. Org-scoped pool runs PR code on prod nodes with a writable hostPath |
| E2 |
Third-party App writes workflows |
Installed by an org owner |
Medium. Two coding-agent Apps hold workflows:write, so they can trigger Path 2 |
Findings and recommendations
Open first, then accepted; each by priority.
| Priority |
Finding |
Fix |
Status |
| Medium |
eso-reader: static key with no expiry, project-wide accessor on all 63 secrets; rotation is "yearly" by hand with no reminder (docs/security/iam.md#eso-reader) |
Bind accessor per secret (or by IAM condition on a cluster-secret prefix) so CI and native secrets are excluded; add a dated rotation runbook entry and an alert on key age; add spec.conditions namespace selectors to gsm-tomoda |
Open |
| Medium |
Prod pins mutable tags with imagePullPolicy: Always; provenance not verified |
Pin prod by digest in the deploy PR; attest with actions/attest-build-provenance and verify before bumping |
Open |
| Medium |
Actions on tags, trivy-action@master, allowed_actions = "all" |
Pin all actions to SHAs (Dependabot keeps them current); restrict allowed_actions to selected |
Open |
| Medium |
ARC hostPath cache shared across repos and PR jobs |
Per-job emptyDir or a cache keyed per repo; keep PR jobs off prod nodes. The trusted pool mounts no hostPath |
Open |
| Medium |
Any org workflow, a PR branch included, can target runs-on: tomoda-arc-trusted (Free plan: one runner group). The prod credentials stay gated by the WIF workflow+main bindings |
A trusted runner group restricted to selected workflows on a paid plan (docs/kubernetes/system/arc-runners.md#trusted-pool-tomoda-arc-trusted) |
Open |
| Medium |
tomoda ota.yml publish reads the prod OTA upload key on the shared tomoda-arc pool, next to PR jobs and their node cache |
Move the prod path of publish to tomoda-arc-trusted |
Open |
| Medium |
Terraform Plan runs PR code on the prod node as terraform-ci and reads the plan-input secrets (same exposure as on a hosted runner, plus in-cluster network reach shared with other PR jobs) |
Plan-only provider tokens where the provider supports them; NetworkPolicy egress limits for arc-runners |
Open |
| Medium |
Native builds and signing on one Mac, no attestation |
Record build host, commit and binary hash per release |
Open |
| Low |
image-updater ClusterRole reads all Secrets |
Scope to a Role on argocd/ghcr-image-updater |
Open |
| Low |
devops Dependabot terraform covers only cloudflare |
Add gcp, gcp-org, github, tailscale directories |
Open |
| High |
No branch protection (GitHub Free): any writer can push devops main, deploying to prod and running apply |
GitHub Free on private repos has no branch protection or rulesets. Mitigations: repo write is limited to the team, admin comes only from the org role, and applies run only from main. Reassess a paid plan for rulesets |
Accepted |
| High |
Org 2FA not required |
The owner chose not to require org 2FA; members without 2FA would be removed from the org. Mitigations: repo access comes through teams, admin only through the org role, and applies run only from main. |
Accepted |