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Access Control

Who can do what across the platform.

Argo CD: SSO via Dex

Argo CD's web UI (https://argo-app.tomoda.life) authenticates through Dex with Google OAuth as the upstream identity provider. Logins are restricted to the tomoda.life Google Workspace domain; anyone outside it is rejected at the OAuth callback.

User --> argo-app.tomoda.life
          |
          v
       oauth2-proxy (domain allow-list)
          |
          v
       Argo CD <-- Dex <-- Google OAuth

Access to the host is gated by oauth2-proxy at the ingress layer (same domain restriction), so even unauthenticated traffic never reaches Argo CD's own login page.

Argo CD RBAC

RBAC is set in k8s/envs/platform/argocd/values.yaml (configs.rbac), matched on the login email (scopes: "[email]"):

Role Permissions Members
role:admin Full control of all apps and projects The emails listed in policy.csv
role:readonly View only (policy.default) Everyone else in the Workspace

Release permissions

Dev deploys on every merge to main in the tomoda repo. Prod deploys when a deploy(prod): tomoda vX.Y.Z PR is merged into this repo's main, so whoever can merge to devops main ships prod; keep that to release managers. The tomoda Release workflow that opens the PR runs only from tomoda main and changes nothing in prod by itself. Merging the PR also publishes that release's prod OTA bundle.

Cluster access

Path Who How
SSH to the server ADMIN_USERS in scripts/ovh/admin-users.sh Over Tailscale only; personal sudo logins with keys from GitHub, no root login. See Server Access
Kubernetes API (:6443) Same people The k3s admin kubeconfig (task kube:auth), over Tailscale
Argo CD UI tomoda.life Google accounts (RBAC above) argo-app.tomoda.life behind oauth2-proxy
OVH console / API Account owner + platform lead OVH account with 2FA; API token scoped to the server
Tailnet tomoda.life members per the policy infrastructure/tailscale/policy.hujson (Server Access)

The k3s kubeconfig is cluster-admin. Each person fetches their own over SSH; rotate the certificates when someone leaves (Removing access).

GCP IAM

GCP holds secrets and identity only.

Service account Used by Access
eso-reader External Secrets (key in external-secrets/gcpsm-credentials) roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor
terraform-ci Terraform plans, any branch, via Workload Identity Federation Read-only: Terraform state + the provider secrets plans read
terraform-apply Terraform applies from terraform-apply.yml on main, via Workload Identity Federation Project IAM, secrets, SAs, WIF, APIs, Terraform state

Roles and the remaining service accounts: IAM.

Human IAM

Human grants are managed in infrastructure/gcp/people.tf (GCP → People and access); change them by PR. The bindings are additive, so Terraform never removes a grant made by hand; check for strays:

gcloud projects get-iam-policy development-485000 \
  --flatten="bindings[].members" \
  --filter="bindings.role:roles/owner OR bindings.role:roles/editor" \
  --format="table(bindings.members,bindings.role)"

GitHub

Org membership, teams, team repo permissions and outside collaborators are managed in infrastructure/github/access.tf (GitHub).

Cloudflare

Account members get the least role that fits (DNS, Workers, R2). R2 API tokens are per purpose: one for the cluster (backups, observability, OTA, seed, Photon index) and one per env for app media. Each is stored in GCP Secret Manager; rotate by creating a new token, updating the secret, and revoking the old one.

Recommendations

  • MFA at Google Workspace, GitHub, Cloudflare and OVH.
  • Review people.tf, access.tf and the Argo CD admin list when someone joins or leaves.