Security¶
Security posture across the platform: secrets, identity, network isolation, TLS and threat models.
The platform runs on one OVH bare-metal k3s cluster behind Cloudflare. GCP holds only Secret Manager, Terraform state, OAuth clients, the Places key and FCM. Baseline principles:
- No secrets in Git. Everything sensitive lives in GCP Secret Manager and reaches Kubernetes through the External Secrets Operator. Terraform CI signs in to GCP with Workload Identity Federation, not a key.
- Few, scoped keys. One GCP key (Secret Manager read-only) bootstraps ESO; R2 tokens are per purpose (one for the cluster, one per env for app media); the GHCR token is
read:packagesonly. - Cloudflare in front. Prod app hostnames are proxied (WAF, DDoS, edge TLS) and the origin accepts only authenticated origin pulls. Cloudflare Access gates
docs.tomoda.life(GitHub org members) andloki-push(a service token); the Tunnel carries onlyloki-push. - Admin access off the public internet where possible. SSH and the k3s API listen only on Tailscale. Admin UIs sit behind oauth2-proxy with a named-operator allow-list, Argo CD behind Dex. A CI policy fails any
*.tomoda.lifeIngress that skips the gate. - App auth in the backend. The tomoda backend verifies Google and Apple tokens, passwords and passkeys, and issues its own JWTs. Per-IP limits, a per-account lockout and an IP blocker sit in front of the auth handlers, keyed on the real client IP.
- Namespace and NetworkPolicy isolation. Dev (
tomoda-dev) and prod (tomoda-prod) share the cluster in separate namespaces; NetworkPolicies limit app and Postgres ingress to Traefik, the app namespace, monitoring and the operator. - TLS everywhere at the edge. cert-manager issues Let's Encrypt certificates for ingress hosts; Cloudflare covers the Worker, Pages and R2 domains and enforces TLS 1.2+ and HTTPS.
- Real client IPs. Traefik keeps the source address (
externalTrafficPolicy: Local) and trustsX-Forwarded-Foronly from Cloudflare's ranges, so per-IP limits and blocks hit the actual client. See Traefik: client IP preservation.
Start here:
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GCP Secret Manager bridged via External Secrets Operator. ClusterSecretStore, ExternalSecrets, rotation.
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The credentials the cluster uses, GCP service accounts, R2 and GHCR tokens.
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:material-shield-network:{ .lg .middle } Network Policies
Pod-to-pod isolation for the app pools, Postgres and NATS.
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cert-manager + Let's Encrypt for ingress; Cloudflare edge settings, origin lock and edge certificates.
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Trivy Operator scans, daily GitHub issues, and upstream-fix triage.
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STRIDE analysis per attack surface, with a consolidated findings register.