oauth2-proxy¶
A single oauth2-proxy Deployment gates every admin UI in the cluster (Argo CD, Grafana, pgAdmin, Redis Insight, the Xavia OTA dashboards). It runs the Google OAuth flow, plants a .tomoda.life cookie, and hands a verdict back to Traefik via forwardAuth.
Installed by k8s/envs/platform/oauth2-proxy/application.yaml; configuration is its inline helm.values block.
Chart and source¶
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Helm chart | oauth2-proxy |
| Repository | https://oauth2-proxy.github.io/manifests |
| Version | 10.7.1 (app v7.15.5) |
| Destination namespace | sys (created by Argo CD) |
| Argo CD Application | oauth2-proxy |
| Public hostname | auth.tomoda.life |
The proxy itself sits behind Traefik with cert-manager-issued TLS at auth.tomoda.life (auth-tls). Sessions live in the encrypted cookie; there is no server-side session store. The Google client secret and cookie secret come from the oauth2-proxy-google Secret (config.existingSecret), an ExternalSecret over GSM tomoda-google-client-secret and tomoda-oauth2-proxy-cookie-secret.
Configuration¶
Key arguments from application.yaml:
extraArgs:
- --provider=google
- --email-domain=tomoda.life
- --cookie-domain=.tomoda.life
- --whitelist-domain=.tomoda.life
- --cookie-secure=true
- --reverse-proxy=true
- --cookie-samesite=lax
- --cookie-httponly=true
- --set-xauthrequest=true
- --redirect-url=https://auth.tomoda.life/oauth2/callback
--provider=googleplus a Google OAuth client (the same brand used by Argo CD's Dex and Grafana'sauth.googleblock).--email-domain=tomoda.lifemeans only@tomoda.lifeGoogle accounts can sign in. Other Google identities are rejected after the OAuth callback.--cookie-domain=.tomoda.lifemakes the session cookie valid for every subdomain: sign in once atargo-app.tomoda.lifeand the same cookie is honoured atgrafana.tomoda.life.
Operator allow-list¶
--email-domain alone admits any @tomoda.life account. Since this one proxy fronts pgAdmin, Redis Insight and Grafana, all of which reach production data, the config adds an explicit allow-list via authenticatedEmailsFile (chart mounts it as a ConfigMap and passes --authenticated-emails-file):
authenticatedEmailsFile:
enabled: true
restricted_access: |-
<one email per line>
The list lives in k8s/envs/platform/oauth2-proxy/application.yaml and holds the operator role mailboxes plus each individual operator. Only those accounts pass the proxy, mirroring the Argo CD RBAC policy.csv in k8s/envs/platform/argocd/values.yaml. The list applies to every UI behind the proxy, Grafana included: a @tomoda.life account not on the list can't view dashboards either. To grant access, add the email to that file (one per line) and let Argo CD sync; there's no per-service exemption without splitting into a second proxy instance.
Traefik integration¶
oauth2-proxy is wired into Traefik using two Middleware CRs in the sys namespace (k8s/envs/platform/manifests/middleware.yaml):
# forwardAuth: ask oauth2-proxy whether the request is authenticated
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: Middleware
metadata:
name: oauth2-proxy-auth
namespace: sys
spec:
forwardAuth:
address: "http://oauth2-proxy.sys.svc.cluster.local:80/oauth2/auth"
trustForwardHeader: true
authResponseHeaders:
- X-Auth-Request-User
- X-Auth-Request-Email
- Set-Cookie
# errors: 401/403 -> redirect to /oauth2/start?rd=<original-url>
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: Middleware
metadata:
name: oauth2-proxy-errors
namespace: sys
spec:
errors:
status: ["401-403"]
service:
name: oauth2-proxy
port: 80
query: "/oauth2/start?rd={url}"
Protected Ingresses include both middlewares as an annotation:
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: sys-oauth2-proxy-errors@kubernetescrd,sys-oauth2-proxy-auth@kubernetescrd
The order matters: errors runs first so unauthenticated requests are turned into a redirect to Google, and auth then verifies the session on the request that comes back.
Argo CD UI gating¶
The Argo CD Ingress (k8s/envs/platform/argocd-ingress/ingress.yaml) carries both middlewares at argo-app.tomoda.life. It also includes a path-level route /oauth2 that points at an ExternalName Service called oauth2-proxy-redir in the argocd namespace. That Service is one of four siblings declared in k8s/envs/platform/manifests/external-services.yaml, each in a different namespace (argocd, data, tomoda-dev, tomoda-prod), all aliasing oauth2-proxy.sys.svc.cluster.local. The OAuth callback URL is https://auth.tomoda.life/oauth2/callback, but the initial /oauth2/start request happens on whatever host the user was trying to reach (e.g. argo-app.tomoda.life); ExternalName Services give every namespace a local handle to route it.
See Argo CD for the full picture of how the UI is authenticated.
Grafana gating¶
Grafana uses the same two middlewares (k8s/envs/platform/monitoring/values.yaml) plus auth.proxy.enabled = true on the Grafana side: Grafana trusts the X-Auth-Request-Email header that oauth2-proxy injects and auto-provisions users from it.
Operational notes¶
- Cookie secret rotation (new GSM version of
tomoda-oauth2-proxy-cookie-secret, then restart the pod) logs everyone out. - Adding a new protected UI is the middleware annotation plus an
/oauth2path tooauth2-proxy-redir; no oauth2-proxy config change as long as the hostname is under*.tomoda.life. - Enforced in CI. A fail-closed conftest policy (
policy/admin_ingress_auth.rego, run byscripts/policy-check.shink8s-validate.yml) fails any PR that exposes a*.tomoda.lifeIngress without theoauth2-proxy-authmiddleware. A genuinely public host must be added to the policy'spublic_hostsallow-list with a justification, or, for a host that is public on only a few paths (Xavia OTA), itspublic_pathsentry; Argo is exempt via its own Dex path. See Authentication threat model.