Threat Model: Authentication
|
|
| Created |
2026-08-09 |
| Last reviewed |
2026-10-19 |
| Next review due |
2027-04-19 (6-month cadence, or on any change to the auth surface) |
| Reviewers |
Platform owner |
| Version |
2.4 |
| Surface owner |
Platform / Auth |
Scope: how people prove who they are to Tomoda. That covers app users signing in to the tomoda backend (password, Google, Apple, passkey, one-time codes), the sessions the backend issues, and operators reaching admin surfaces (oauth2-proxy, Argo CD Dex, Cloudflare Access, Tailscale). The synthetic probe account is in scope because it is a real prod login.
Out of scope: edge and origin lock (network & ingress), secret delivery and CI identities (secrets & supply chain, Release Integrity), and data-store access (data plane).
Code references are to the tomoda repo's backend/ unless they start with one of this repo's paths. How the pieces work: GCP → OAuth clients, oauth2-proxy, Access Control, Server Access, Synthetic monitoring.
Data flow diagrams
App users and operators authenticate on separate paths. Opening one does not open the other.
Path 1: app sign-in and session use
Every request crosses Cloudflare (proxied, WAF, origin-locked) and Traefik before the backend. Inside the backend, the IP blocker and per-IP limiters run before any auth handler.
flowchart LR
E1([E1 · App user]) -->|F1 HTTPS| P0
E3([E3 · Google / Apple<br/>identity provider]) -->|F2 ID token| E1
subgraph edge[trust boundary: Cloudflare + Traefik]
P0[P0 · edge<br/>WAF · origin pull · client IP]
end
P0 -->|F3 request + client IP| P1
subgraph backend[trust boundary: tomoda backend]
P1[P1 · IP blocker<br/>per-IP limiters]
P1 --> P2[P2 · auth handlers<br/>password · social · passkey · OTP]
P2 -->|F4 lookup / history| D1[(D1 · Postgres<br/>users · login_histories<br/>refresh_tokens · webauthn)]
P2 -->|F5 counters · challenges| D3[(D3 · Redis<br/>limits · blocks · OTP budget)]
P3[P3 · JWTAuth<br/>signature · token_version · status]
P3 --> D1
end
P2 -->|F6 access JWT + refresh token| E1
E1 -->|F7 Bearer JWT| P3
Path 2: operator access
flowchart LR
E2([E2 · Operator]) -->|F8 HTTPS| P4
E2 -->|F11 WireGuard| P7
subgraph cf[trust boundary: Cloudflare Access]
P6[P6 · Access<br/>GitHub org · service token]
end
E2 -->|F12 HTTPS| P6
P6 --> X1[docs.tomoda.life<br/>loki-push]
subgraph edge[trust boundary: cluster edge]
P4[P4 · oauth2-proxy<br/>allow-list · or Argo Dex + RBAC]
P4 -->|F9 X-Auth-Request-Email| P5[P5 · admin UIs<br/>Grafana · pgAdmin · redis-insight<br/>OTA dashboard · Argo CD]
end
P5 -->|F10 SQL / Redis| D2[(D2 · production data)]
subgraph ts[trust boundary: tailnet]
P7[P7 · Tailscale<br/>tcp 22 · 6443 to tag:server]
end
P7 --> X2[SSH · k3s API]
DFD elements
| Ref |
Type |
Element |
Notes |
| E1 |
External entity |
App user |
Any Google or Apple account, or an email + password |
| E2 |
External entity |
Operator |
tomoda.life Google account, tailnet member, tomoda-labs GitHub member |
| E3 |
External entity |
Identity providers |
Google and Apple mint the ID tokens |
| P0 |
Process |
Cloudflare + Traefik |
Traefik trusts X-Forwarded-For only from Cloudflare ranges |
| P1 |
Process |
IP blocker + limiters |
middleware/ip_blocker.go, middleware/rate_limiter.go |
| P2 |
Process |
Auth handlers |
services/auth/ |
| P3 |
Process |
JWT middleware |
middleware/auth.go |
| P4 |
Process |
oauth2-proxy / Dex |
k8s/envs/platform/oauth2-proxy/, k8s/envs/platform/argocd/values.yaml |
| P5 |
Process |
Admin UIs |
Behind P4 |
| P6 |
Process |
Cloudflare Access |
infrastructure/cloudflare/access.tf |
| P7 |
Process |
Tailscale |
infrastructure/tailscale/policy.hujson |
| D1 |
Data store |
Auth tables in Postgres |
Link keys are provider subjects |
| D2 |
Data store |
Production data |
Reached only through P5 or P7 |
| D3 |
Data store |
Redis |
Limiter counters, IP blocks, OTP budget, WebAuthn challenges |
Assets and trust boundaries
| Asset |
DFD |
Boundary crossed |
| App user identity |
E1/E3→P2 |
Internet → edge → backend |
| Access JWT and refresh token |
P2→E1, E1→P3 |
Backend → device storage → backend |
| Password hashes, provider links, passkey keys |
D1 |
Backend → Postgres |
| OTP codes and attempt budget |
D1, D3 |
Backend → email, Redis |
JWT_SECRET, OAuth client secrets |
(out of band) |
Secret Manager → ESO → tomoda-prod |
| Operator sessions |
E2→P4, P6 |
Browser → cluster edge, Cloudflare Access |
| Server and cluster-admin access |
E2→P7 |
Tailnet → node |
Controls in place
| Control |
Value |
Where |
| Client IP |
Rightmost untrusted X-Forwarded-For hop past the pod CIDR and Cloudflare ranges |
api/context.go, config.prod.yaml trusted_proxies |
| Edge rate limit |
20 requests per 10s per IP and colo on the credential endpoints, 10s block, at Cloudflare before the origin |
devops infrastructure/cloudflare/waf.tf |
| Global limit |
600 req/min/IP on /api/v1, fails open |
RateLimiter.APILimit |
| Login limit |
10 per 15 min per IP on password, Google, Apple and passkey routes, fails closed |
LoginLimit |
| Register / reset / OTP limits |
5/h, 5/h, 10 per 15 min per IP, fail closed |
rate_limiter.go |
| Account lockout |
5 failed passwords in 15 min. Failures before a later success don't count, and lockout refusals are audited but never counted, so the lockout ends 15 min after the last real failure |
SessionService.CheckLoginRateLimit, CountFailedLoginAttempts |
| OTP |
6 digits, 10 min TTL, single use, 5 verifies per address per 15 min (fails closed), a new send retires the old code |
otp_service.go |
| IP blocker |
Global, before routing. Rejects probe-pattern requests and blocks repeat offenders; never blocks Cloudflare's published ranges or private and loopback addresses. Thresholds, signed Worker bypass and unblock path: app repo docs/backend/security/ip-blocker.md |
ip_blocker.go |
| Google |
idtoken.Validate, aud in the web/iOS/Android client set, email_verified required |
verifyGoogleIDToken |
| Apple |
RS256, issuer appleid.apple.com, exp required, aud = bundle or service ID, email_verified if email present |
verifyAppleIDToken |
| Social linking |
Google and Apple link only by subject; a shared email returns SOCIAL_LINK_REQUIRED |
emailAlreadyOwned |
| Login finalization |
Password, Google, Apple and passkey logins all end in finalizeLogin: inactive and suspended accounts are refused, then tokens are issued and a login_histories row is written. New social accounts pass the 3-per-device cap and, when the provider sends a birthdate, the 18+ check |
finalizeLogin |
| Passkeys |
RP ID tomoda.life, origin https://tomoda.life, 5 min challenge in Redis, sign counter persisted |
config.prod.yaml webauthn, FinishWebAuthnLogin |
| Token transport |
Authorization: Bearer only. ?token= is accepted only on /ws/* upgrades, where browsers cannot set headers |
requestToken in middleware/auth.go |
| Query strings in logs |
Traefik's access log keeps query strings; Alloy redacts the values of tokens, codes, passwords, signatures, identifier and X-Amz-* params before Loki. The backend request log redacts token keys |
k8s/envs/platform/traefik/values.yaml, k8s/envs/platform/loki/values-alloy.yaml |
| Access JWT |
HS256, 24h, secret at least 32 bytes and not the dev placeholder (boot fails otherwise) |
GenerateToken, config.go |
| Revocation |
Each request checks token_version and account status (60s cache); reset password, revoke-all and admin ban terminate sessions |
JWTAuth, TerminateUserSessions |
| Refresh token |
32 random bytes, sliding 180 days (native) or 30 days (web), 365-day cap, Postgres is the authority |
session_service.go |
| Admin authorization |
access.Require(TomodaAdmin): account type tomoda and role admin |
access/policies.go |
| Operator gates |
oauth2-proxy allow-list of four named accounts; Argo Dex hostedDomains + RBAC default readonly; fail-closed CI policy on every *.tomoda.life Ingress |
policy/admin_ingress_auth.rego |
| Cloudflare Access |
docs.tomoda.life: tomoda-labs GitHub org members. loki-push: synthetic Worker service token only |
access.tf |
| Server access |
Tailscale only (22 and 6443 on tailscale0); personal SSH logins, no root, no password login |
Server Access |
| Synthetic canaries |
login (200), login-bad-password (401) and auth-middleware (401) every minute |
synthetic/worker.js |
STRIDE
Spoofing
| DFD |
Threat |
Control |
Residual |
| E3/P2 |
Forged or wrong-audience Google/Apple token |
Signature, issuer, expiry and audience checks above |
Low |
| E1/P2/D1 |
Email-collision takeover through a new social identity |
Google and Apple refuse to merge by email |
Low |
| E1/P2 |
Stolen access JWT used where proof of email control is required (password reset, deletion reauth) |
OTP tokens are typed, purpose-bound and signed with their own key, so an access token is refused where a verified code is required |
Low |
| E1/P2 |
Password guessing |
Per-IP login limit, per-account lockout, bcrypt cost 12 |
Low |
| E1/P2 |
Credential spray across rotating IPs |
Per-account lockout |
Low |
| E1/P2 |
OTP brute force |
5 verifies per address, a new send retires the old code |
Low |
| E3/P2 |
Replay of a captured ID token |
The nonce is compared with a value the client sends in the same request; the server never issues or stores it |
Low, accepted. Gives no replay protection; ID tokens are short-lived |
| P4/P5 |
Injected X-Auth-Request-Email to impersonate an operator in Grafana |
Traefik forwardAuth overwrites authResponseHeaders from oauth2-proxy; CI policy requires the middleware |
Low |
Tampering
| DFD |
Threat |
Control |
Residual |
| P4/P5 |
Admin UI exposed without the gate |
Fail-closed policy/admin_ingress_auth.rego in k8s-validate.yml; OTA hosts may expose only three Exact paths |
Low |
| P4 |
Allow-list or RBAC edited in the cluster |
GitOps with self-heal |
Low |
| P6/P7 |
Access or tailnet policy edited in a console |
Both in Terraform; the next apply reverts drift |
Low |
Repudiation
| DFD |
Threat |
Control |
Residual |
| E1/P2 |
App login not attributable |
Audit log on every login; login_histories with IP, device and risk score for every login method (kept 180 days) |
Low |
| E2/P5 |
Operator action not attributable |
Grafana provisions from the proxy header; Argo RBAC uses the Dex identity |
Low-Medium. pgAdmin and redis-insight attribute only through the proxy access log |
| DFD |
Threat |
Control |
Residual |
| E1/P3 |
Access JWT leaked through logs |
Query tokens only on /ws/*; Alloy redacts sensitive params from Traefik lines before Loki; the backend redacts token keys |
Low. The unredacted Traefik line sits in the pod log on the node until rotation and shows in kubectl logs; a new secret param is only redacted once it is added to the Alloy list |
| D1 |
Database or backup read yields live credentials |
Database and backup access (data plane page) |
Low-Medium. Refresh tokens are stored in Postgres as issued (refresh_tokens.token, sessions.refresh_token), so a read yields tokens that mint access JWTs. Only the Redis mirror key is a SHA-256 hash |
| E1/P2 |
Account enumeration |
Login returns invalid credentials for unknown users |
Low. A locked account returns 429 rather than 401, unknown users skip bcrypt (timing), and passkey login/begin answers differently for unknown identifiers |
| (secret) |
OAuth client secret or JWT secret leaked |
GCP Secret Manager through ESO |
Low |
| E2/P4 |
Operator session cookie theft |
Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, TLS |
Low |
Denial of service
| DFD |
Threat |
Control |
Residual |
| E1/P1 |
Login flood |
Per-IP limits fail closed, so a Redis outage rejects logins rather than leaving them unthrottled |
Low |
| E1/P2 |
Attacker keeps a victim's password login locked |
Lockout refusals don't extend the lockout; passkey and social login still work |
Low. One failed guess each time the window slides keeps the account locked |
| E1/P1 |
IP blocker false positive |
Clear exploit traffic is blocked at the edge first; the app's block policy and exemptions are in the app repo's ip-blocker.md |
Low |
| E1 |
Probe account locked by a stranger |
None |
Low. Its email is public in this repo; 5 bad passwords page login DOWN for 15 min |
| P4 |
oauth2-proxy outage |
Single replica, cookie sessions |
Medium, accepted. Operational tooling only |
Elevation of privilege
| DFD |
Threat |
Control |
Residual |
| E1/P3 |
App user reaches admin routes |
Default RoleBase; admin routes need account type tomoda + role admin |
Low |
| P3 |
Demoted admin keeps privileges |
Role is read from the JWT claim |
Low. A DB-only role change lasts until the token expires (up to 24h) unless token_version is bumped |
| E1/P2 |
Suspended or inactive user signs in through a side path |
Every login method ends in finalizeLogin; JWTAuth also rejects unusable accounts on every request |
Low |
| E1/P3 |
Revocation bypassed during a DB/Redis blip |
Deleted users fail closed |
Low, accepted. token_version, account status and lockout checks fail open on infrastructure errors |
| E2/P4 |
Operator gains Argo write unexpectedly |
RBAC default readonly, four named admins |
Low |
| P4 |
App-side OAuth client incident disrupts admin login |
None. App, oauth2-proxy and Dex share client 287267207777-7d0c… |
Medium, open |
| E1 |
Probe account used beyond probing |
Account type synthetic; password in Secret Manager and the Worker |
Low. It is a full, age-verified standard account, and each boot forces is_active=true |
Findings and recommendations
Ordered by priority.
- Shared OAuth client (Medium, open). Give oauth2-proxy and Dex their own web client (GCP → OAuth clients).
- Refresh tokens stored as issued (Low). Postgres keeps the token string in
refresh_tokens.token and sessions.refresh_token; only the Redis key is hashed. A database or backup read yields tokens that stay valid until they expire, and each use slides the expiry up to the 365-day cap. Store a SHA-256 hash of the token in both tables and look it up by hash on refresh and revoke.
- Enumeration and victim lockout (Low). Return the same status for a locked account and bad credentials, and run a dummy bcrypt for unknown users.
- Probe account scope (Low). Restrict account type
synthetic to the auth and health routes, and exclude it from the lockout or alert on login only after consecutive failures.
- Role changes and
token_version (Low). Bump token_version on any role or account-type change.
- Operator attribution for pgAdmin and redis-insight (Low). The proxy access log is the only record.
- Nonce not server-issued (Low, accepted).