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Threat Model: Release Integrity

Created 2026-10-12
Last reviewed 2026-10-13
Next review due 2027-04-13 (6-month cadence, or on any change to CI identities, OTA or the mobile release path)
Reviewers Platform owner
Version 1.2
Surface owner Platform / Release

Scope: the identities CI holds outside the cluster, and the path that puts code on users' phones. That means the Terraform CI identity (Workload Identity Federation into GCP, plus the provider tokens it reads), the release workflows' WIF identity, OTA publishing and signing through Xavia, and the mobile client's trust in what it receives and stores.

Out of scope: image builds, ARC runners and Argo CD delivery (Secrets & Supply Chain), and sign-in (Authentication). How the pieces work: Terraform CI/CD, Deploy → Mobile app, Xavia OTA, GCP.

GitHub branch protection, rulesets and environment reviewers are not available on the org's plan for private repos. Every control below that depends on review depends on convention.

Data flow diagrams

Path 1: Terraform CI identity

flowchart LR
    E1([E1 · repo writer]) -->|F1 push branch / PR| P1
    subgraph gh[trust boundary: GitHub Actions]
        P1[P1 · terraform-plan on PR<br/>terraform-apply on main]
    end
    P1 -->|F2 OIDC token<br/>repo, workflow, ref| P2
    subgraph gcp[trust boundary: GCP project]
        P2[P2 · WIF pool<br/>plan: terraform-ci, read-only<br/>apply on main: terraform-apply]
        P2 --> D1[(D1 · Secret Manager<br/>provider tokens · app secrets)]
        P2 --> D2[(D2 · project IAM<br/>tfstate bucket)]
    end
    D1 -->|F3 Cloudflare · GitHub · Tailscale tokens| P1

Path 2: OTA publish and update

flowchart LR
    E1([E1 · tomoda writer]) -->|F4 push main / Release run| P3
    subgraph gh[trust boundary: GitHub Actions]
        P3[P3 · ota.yml on tomoda-arc<br/>prod key via WIF on main]
    end
    P3 -->|F8 OIDC token, ota.yml on main| P5
    subgraph gcp[trust boundary: GCP project]
        P5[P5 · WIF pool github-actions-tomoda<br/>tomoda-release SA]
        P5 --> D4[(D4 · tomoda-ota-prod-upload-key)]
    end
    D4 -->|F9 prod upload key| P3
    P3 -->|F5 POST /api/upload + uploadKey| P4
    subgraph cluster[trust boundary: platform namespace]
        P4[P4 · Xavia server<br/>holds signing private key]
        P4 --> D3[(D3 · R2 tomoda-ota-*<br/>Xavia Postgres)]
    end
    E2([E2 · installed app<br/>bundled public cert]) -->|F6 GET /api/manifest · /api/assets| P4
    P4 -->|F7 signed manifest + bundle| E2

DFD elements

Ref Type Element Notes
E1 External entity Repo writer Anyone with write access to devops or tomoda
E2 External entity Installed app Verifies manifests against frontend/certs/ota-public.pem
P1 Process Terraform workflows terraform-plan.yml (pull_request), terraform-apply.yml (push to main)
P2 Process WIF provider infrastructure/gcp/wif.tf
P3 Process OTA workflow tomoda .github/workflows/ota.yml
P4 Process Xavia server k8s/envs/platform/xavia-ota-{dev,prod}/
P5 Process tomoda WIF pool, tomoda-release infrastructure/gcp/wif.tf; tomoda tokens on refs/heads/main only
D1 Data store Secret Manager Every prod secret and provider token
D2 Data store Project IAM, tfstate terraform-apply holds projectIamAdmin; terraform-ci is read-only
D3 Data store OTA storage Bundles in R2, release records in Xavia Postgres
D4 Data store Prod upload key Secret Manager; read by tomoda-release (CI) and the prod Xavia ExternalSecret

Assets and trust boundaries

Asset DFD Boundary crossed
terraform-apply and terraform-ci identities P1→P2 GitHub → GCP
Provider tokens (Cloudflare, GitHub, Tailscale) D1→P1 GCP → runner
OTA prod upload key D4→P3→P4 GCP → runner → public /api/upload
OTA dev upload key P3→P4 Repo secret → public /api/upload
OTA signing key P4 Lives in both Xavia pods' env
JS bundle running on every phone P4→E2 Cluster → device
Session tokens on the device E2 App storage

STRIDE

Spoofing

DFD Threat Control Residual
P1/P2 A branch or PR workflow impersonates the apply identity The github-actions pool accepts only assertion.repository == tomoda-labs/devops; fork PRs get no OIDC token. terraform-apply is bound through job_workflow_ref to terraform-apply.yml on refs/heads/main (infrastructure/gcp/wif.tf). Any other ref gets only read-only terraform-ci Low. A push to main applies; see finding 3
P3/P4 Someone publishes a prod OTA bundle outside a release The prod upload key is in Secret Manager only. The tomoda provider accepts only ref == refs/heads/main and tomoda-release is bound through job_workflow_ref to release.yml and ota.yml on main, so branch, tag and PR runs get no token. On main, prod-pin refuses a tag devops main doesn't pin Medium. A push to tomoda main can edit ota.yml and skip prod-pin; see finding 3
E2/P4 A forged server or CDN serves a bundle Manifests are code-signed (RSA, keyid: main); the app ships the public cert Low

Tampering

DFD Threat Control Residual
P4/E2 A compromised Xavia pod or upload key ships arbitrary JS Signing Medium. Xavia signs on the server with PRIVATE_KEY_BASE_64, so signing does not protect against the server or anyone holding an upload key. The app's comment that a compromised host can't push JS is wrong
P4 Dev instance compromise yields the prod signing key Separate instances, upload keys and DB passwords Medium. One signing key is shared by dev and prod; both pods sit in platform
D3 Bundle replaced in R2 Bundles are signed at publish; R2 token is cluster-scoped Low. A swapped asset fails the hash in the signed manifest
E2 Bundle for an incompatible binary runtimeVersion fingerprint policy Low

Repudiation

DFD Threat Control Residual
P3/P4 Who published a bundle Xavia records commit hash and message; Actions run log Low. Upload key is shared, so an out-of-band upload is attributable only by its claimed commit
P1/P2 Who used terraform-apply or terraform-ci GCP audit logs name the WIF principal with repository and ref Low

Information disclosure

DFD Threat Control Residual
D1/P1 Workflow exfiltrates Secret Manager Plans read only the plan inputs (secretAccessor on local.terraform_ci_plan_secrets); secretmanager.admin sits with terraform-apply, which only main can assume High, accepted. A PR plan can read the plan inputs, which include write-capable provider tokens (finding 4)
E2 Tokens read off the device iOS Keychain mirror is AFTER_FIRST_UNLOCK in a shared access group Medium. AsyncStorage is the source of truth, unencrypted on Android, and holds a 180-day refresh token. An extracted token is a full session

Denial of service

DFD Threat Control Residual
P4 Bad bundle bricks the app npm test gates the publish; dashboard rollback behind oauth2-proxy Low-Medium. Rollback needs an operator
P4 Upload flood Upload key Low

Elevation of privilege

DFD Threat Control Residual
P2/D2 A CI identity grants itself or others more Only terraform-apply holds projectIamAdmin, serviceAccountAdmin and workloadIdentityPoolAdmin, and only terraform-apply.yml on main can assume it. terraform-ci holds read roles only Low. A push to main applies; see finding 3
P1/D1 Plan run gains Cloudflare, GitHub or Tailscale write Tokens read from Secret Manager at plan time; fork PRs get no OIDC token High, accepted. One credential per provider serves plan and apply, so plans load write-capable tokens and any branch push can change DNS, Access, the tailnet policy or GitHub settings (finding 4)

Findings and recommendations

Ordered by priority: open, then accepted.

  1. Server-side OTA signing (Medium). Sign bundles in CI with a key Xavia never sees, or accept and correct the app's comment. Give dev its own signing key and cert.
  2. Mobile token storage (Medium). Make Keychain (iOS) and Keystore-backed storage (Android) the source of truth for refresh tokens.
  3. No branch protection (High, accepted; registered under Secrets & Supply Chain). GitHub Free on private repos has no branch protection or rulesets, so a second writer's review on both repos' main is convention only. Mitigations: repo write is limited to the team, admin comes only from the org role, and applies run only from main. Keep writer lists short and reviewed quarterly with Access Control.
  4. Plans load write-capable Cloudflare, Tailscale and GitHub credentials (High, accepted). One credential per provider serves plan and apply, so any branch push can change DNS, Access, the tailnet policy or GitHub settings. Fork PRs get no OIDC token, and repo write is limited to the team.